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Abstract
We explore the impact of strategic behaviour of equity holders, debt holders and an opportunistic supplier of
a critical input on the firm’s capital structure, organisational design, and its outsourcing decision. We show
that the supplier can trigger strategic bankruptcy even when the firm is solvent. Equity holders respond
to this either by eliminating the supplier and producing the input in-house or by reducing their exposure
to debt by using equity-financing. Both responses introduce inefficiency since input costs are higher with
in-house production, and debt is cheaper than equity. We show that the equilibrium debt-equity ratio varies
positively with cash-flow profitability and the marginal cost of the supplier’s input, but negatively with the
riskiness of the cash flow and the equity holders’ in-house input production costs.
Keywords: incomplete contracts, opportunistic behaviour, bankruptcy, capital structure. D0, C7, G3, L2
1. Introduction
A vast literature on capital structure examines the interactions between real and financial markets.
A common theme in this literature is that a firm may use the composition of its financial claims as an
instrument to deal with various imperfections arising from agency problems, informational asymmetries,
regulation, non-competitive markets, and unions, among others.15
More recently, the stakeholder theory of capital structure has been discussed in several theoretical and
empirical studies. The basic idea behind this theory is that a firm is a collection of its stakeholders (workers,
IWe are indebted to the editor Bart Lambrecht for his valuable inputs on the paper and two anonymous referees for their
insightful comments on successive drafts of the paper. We wish to thank BGA, Vikram Nanda, Abhijit Sengupta and two
anonymous referees for substantive comments. We also wish to thank participants of the seminars held at the University
of Sydney, University Complutense of Madrid, University of Melbourne, University of New South Wales, Charles University,
CERGE, Prague and the University of Athens for their valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1The earlier literature on this subject began with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and was developed by a series of papers in
the 80s and 90s. See Harris and Raviv (1991) and Allen and Winton (1995) for an early summary of this literature. For a more
recent survey, see Frank and Goyal (2008).
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suppliers, creditors, customers, equity holders, etc.) and the relationships among them determine its financial
and investment policies. For example, Titman (1984) argues that liquidation of a bankrupt firm hurts the
long term prospects of its suppliers and customers due to “switching costs” (for example, the costs of locating10
new business partners. See Williamson (1975)).
These stakeholders take such costs into account when selling or buying from firms that run the risk of
bankruptcy in the near future. Consequently, they reduce the volume of business with highly leveraged firms
out of fear of bankruptcy. The anticipation of such behaviour by stakeholders in turn prompts firms to
reduce their levels of debt. Following Titman (1984), the role of financing decisions in shaping relationships15
and bargaining power among stakeholders during bankruptcy has been extensively analysed theoretically
and empirically.2
In recent times, stakeholder theory has been extended to previously unexplored areas.3 A common
feature of this literature is that each stakeholder acts independently. The possible formation of alliances by
stakeholders’ ex-post has not been explicitly recognised in the analysis of a firm’s financing and investment20
decisions. In reality, however, alliances are often attractive as they may increase the ex-post power of
stakeholders. This may in turn affect the ex-ante choices of financing and investment.
There are many real life examples that illustrate the power of stakeholder behaviour in the face of
bankruptcy. One commonly cited example is the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of Olympia and York, where
a breakaway group of creditors, suppliers and other initial stakeholders took over the former’s Canary Wharf25
venture in London, and eventually drove out the original equity holders.4
We attempt to fill this gap by showing that the divergence of stakeholder interests becomes critical in
the face of bankruptcy and this may affect a firm’s ex-ante choice of capital structure and organisational
2The following represents a selection of the early literature in this area. Brander and Lewis (1986); Brander and Spencer
(1989); Bronars and Deere (1991); Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993); Perotti and Spier (1993); Appelbaum (1993); Habib and
Johnsen (1999); Hennessy and Livdan (2009); and Matsa (2010) provide theoretical analysis. On the other hand Titman and
Wessels (1988); Kale and Shahrur (2007); and Banerjee et al. (2008), among others, provide empirical studies of the prevalence
of low levels of debt. For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Parsons and Titman (2008).
3The following is a selection of recent papers in this literature. Almazan et al. (2017) show how firms can use investment
choices and the capital budgeting process to transmit information for the purpose of incentivising stakeholders (workers). Cen
et al. (2015) analyse how decreased vulnerability as a result of anti-takeover provisions enhance firm value by helping firms
build new customer relationships while preserving existing ones. Dasgupta et al. (2017) show how regulatory shocks affect
product market competitiveness and may force greater CEO turnover in weakly governed firms, but improve performance
and compensations in firms with better governance. Using cross-country data Ellul et al. (2018) show how publicly provided
insurance leads to lower wages but greater employment stability, potentially leading to longer term stakeholder relationships.
Lambrecht and Pawlina (2013) explain the emergence of negative net debt and debt conservatism in a set up where firms facing
bankruptcy risk employ transferable human capital against which tradable financial claims cannot be issued. They show that
a combination of such frictions together with a constraint on managerial finance may lead to negative net debt in equilibrium.
4Other instances of bankruptcy arising from conflict between stakeholders include the following: (i) The opportunistic
multiple party bankruptcy bargaining, involving Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, its United Steelworkers of America
workers, and its creditors. (ii) The case of Campeau where the suppliers triggered bankruptcy (nyt (1990)). (iii) The case of
GM, where a debt-equity swap deal was initially rejected by a tough bargaining position by the creditors and the unions (wsj
(2009)), (iv) the case of Skeena Cellulose Inc. where the creditors formed a joint venture with the British Columbia government
as the majority stakeholder after severe financial woes. (v) Continental Airlines’ use of bankruptcy threats to extract union
concessions. (vi) Texaco’s attempts to use insolvency to avoid payment of damages to its arch rival Pennzoil.
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design. We analyse the choice of capital structure and organisational design made by the firm at the start
through a non-cooperative lens, as it anticipates the possibility of opportunistic behaviour of the supplier in30
the case of bankruptcy.
We explore the interactions between three stakeholders, namely equity holders, debt holders and a supplier
of a critical input.5 We examine the co-determination of the choice of a firm’s capital structure and its
organisational design. In particular by capital structure we mean the debt-equity ratio, and by organisational
design we mean the choice between procuring input from an outside supplier (outsourcing) and producing35
such input in-house. We analyse a previously undiscovered cost of the co-existence of debt holders and
suppliers. This cost induces the firm to choose equity over debt and in-house production over outsourcing
even when debt and outsourcing are cheaper.
In our set-up, the supplier provides a critical input to the production process so he is capable of running
the firm with the debt holders. This ability to shut out the equity holders creates a potential for conflict when40
the firm is on the verge of financial distress and gives rise to a novel cost of debt. This creates a trade-off
between cheap debt on the one hand and the possibility of strategic behaviour by the supplier (summed up
in Proposition 2) leading to the co-determination of a firm’s capital structure and its organisational design
as described in the following paragraph.
If a firm issues more debt instead of equity to finance its capital requirements, it benefits as equity is more45
expensive than debt.6 On the other hand, the cost of debt is the increased likelihood of strategic bankruptcy
triggered by the supplier which results in the loss of surplus as the equity holders are shut out. The threat
of strategic bankruptcy is dealt with in one of two ways – (a) firms with a low capital requirement respond
by reducing the debt-equity ratio, whereas (b) firms with a large capital requirement shut out the outside
supplier by producing the input in-house, and continue to rely on debt.50
In our set-up, strategic bankruptcy is costly because it is a regime where the supplier pushes the equity
and the debt holders to what their payoffs would be in case of non-strategic bankruptcy. Non-strategic
bankruptcy is the standard bankruptcy regime where the equity holders receive nothing and the debt holders
5In this paper, we use the term outside “supplier” to represent a third party to the contract, who provides an input which
is essential in the production process. To fix ideas, we consider this party the supplier. However, the model may extend to
environments where the party may be a large investor, a partner in a venture capital firm, a skilled worker, or a complementary
group of shareholders contributing value to the firm. The trade-off we highlight is between a superior technology that requires
cooperation between multiple stakeholders vs. an inferior technology that can be operated jointly by a few stakeholders. This
trade-off may arise in a more general model where the stakeholders are not specifically labelled. We are indebted to a referee
for pointing out this out.
6In order to discuss a meaningful trade-off between debt and equity as a choice of financing, we assume that debt is cheaper
that equity. This is micro founded on the idea that debt is subject to tax shields or explicit or implicit subsidies, like loan
guarantees by the government. Equity may also be more expensive due to agency costs and informational asymmetry between
the equity holders and the managers of the firm. Furthermore, equity being paid only in high states of nature is riskier due
to informational asymmetries about the upside potential of the firm. With this, we attempt to analyse situations where firms
issue equity even when it is more expensive than debt.
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receive the liquidation value of the assets. As a result, in the state of bankruptcy, the equity holders withhold
their input (effort) thereby reducing the value of the firm. The incremental surplus lost to shareholders in55
a strategic bankruptcy turns out to be the difference between the cash flow in solvent states (where both
the equity holders and the supplier contribute inputs jointly) and in the state of bankruptcy when only the
supplier provides an input. Essentially the (incremental) surplus lost is equal to the difference of firm value
in case it is solvent and the same when the firm is a bankrupt entity. The optimal debt-equity ratio equates
this cost of strategic bankruptcy to the benefit of cheap debt at the margin.60
Based on this trade-off, we derive the optimal debt-equity ratio and show that this depends negatively
on (a) the marginal cost of the supplier’s input and (b) the riskiness of cash flow but depends positively on
(c) the gross profitability of the project, and (d) the firm’s own marginal cost of production of its own input.
These variables affect the optimal debt-equity ratio because they impact either the probability of strategic
bankruptcy or the lost incremental surplus in case of strategic bankruptcy.65
When the state of nature is favourable, the supplier cannot trigger bankruptcy. On the other hand, no
stakeholder can save the firm from going bankrupt when the state of nature is sufficiently unfavourable. This
result is reminiscent of conclusions drawn by Hart and Moore (1998) where the equity holders cannot prevent
a foreclosure because they lack of sufficient funds to compensate the supplier and the debt holders. However,
for states of nature between these extremes, the supplier compares his own pay-off between solvency (when70
he supplies his input jointly with the equity holders and shares the pie with both the equity and debt holders)
and bankruptcy where he provides the input and shares the proceeds with the debt holders alone. Since the
supplier can only profitably trigger bankruptcy if he brings the debt holders on board, issuing debt ex-ante
imposes the cost of potential strategic bankruptcy on the equity holders.
Our paper makes three contributions to the literature investigating the impact of stakeholders’ complex75
relationship on a firm’s choice of financing and organisational design. First, we find a novel cost of debt,
hitherto unexplored in the literature, arising out of the supplier’s incentives to withdraw critical input during
economic distress. This cost leads to a choice of expensive equity financing over cheaper debt. Moreover
this cost is relevant only for industries dependent on the supply of a critical input. Hence, a primary
contribution of this paper is to provide explanations for why supplier dependent industries tend to use80
a smaller volume of debt in spite of its other benefits. Known as “debt conservatism” or “zero leveraged
firms”, a large empirical literature establishes that firms eschew cheap debt and issue equity wherever supply
considerations of crucial input play a big role.7 While the existing explanations of the costs of debt including
7Titman and Wessels (1988), Qian (2003), Strebulaev (2007), Strebulaev and Yang (2013), Kale and Shahrur (2007), and
Banerjee et al. (2008) among others, have examined the relationship between a firm and its primary stakeholders, such as
suppliers and customers, and studied the effect of such relationships on the choice of capital structure. These empirical papers
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“risk shifting”, bankruptcy costs, or debt overhang, etc. hold true in general, the novelty of our result is to
show the existence of a cost of debt that particularly arises when the suppliers can withdraw a critical input,85
thereby triggering both strategic bankruptcy and the destruction of firm value.
Second, we show that this possibility of strategic stakeholder behaviour affects not just the composition of
financing but organisational design as it forces the firm to inefficiently expand its boundaries by eliminating
the supplier and producing its critical input in-house. As a consequence, we derive new empirical predictions
described as follows: Beyond a critical size, a firm will exclusively use cheaper debt but then produce its90
critical input in-house which could be obtained more cheaply outside. However below the critical size, a firm
will outsource the production of its critical input but will be forced to use equity over cheaper debt. That is,
debt conservatism, as found in the empirical literature would be more common in smaller or medium sized
firms while larger firms will rely on debt but produce critical inputs in-house.
The hold-up problem in our model is not just due to the conflict between the equity holders and the95
supplier. Instead it stems from the inability of the equity holders to stop the suppliers from triggering
bankruptcy. This source of friction has not been explored in prevailing literature.
Such hold-up problems create inefficiency as the firm is either forced to issue more expensive equity or
produce the input in-house at a higher cost. This inefficiency is created by the inability to write a contract
that specifies the terms of a future contract if a party to the contract defects (much in the same way that a100
first marriage contract cannot specify the terms of a potential second marriage contract if the first marriage
breaks down and the parties re-marry). The basic premise of the paper is that while the equity holders can
write a complete and enforceable debt contract, they cannot write such a contract with the suppliers. The
two contracts are, therefore, asymmetric. It is the incompleteness of the contract with the suppliers that
gives rise to opportunistic behaviour, namely, possible strategic bankruptcy.105
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the timeline of the model. In sections 3 and 4
we analyse the firm’s capital structure and post-bankruptcy negotiations under outsourcing and in-house
production, respectively. Section 5 presents the firm’s choice between in-house production and outsourcing.
We discuss our results and the role of key assumptions in our model in sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
Section 6 concludes.110
find that firms producing durable goods use specialised and non-substitutable inputs. Such firms that depend heavily on
suppliers or supply chains for procurement of inputs tend to underuse debt as a source of external finance. Berk et al. (2010)
show that empirically observed low debt ratio could emerge when a firm needs to compensate risk averse entrenched workers
with higher compensation for insuring them from bankruptcy risk associated with leverage. Hence, a reduction in debt may
reduce the wage premium. Lambrecht and Pawlina (2013) also explain debt avoidance in human capital intensive industries
with a different mechanism (See footnote 3). Our setup differs from these papers as we introduce strategic bankruptcy which
is not the focus of these papers.
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2. Structure and timeline
We consider a firm that uses three inputs x, y, and K in its production process. The gross profits of the
firm are
R(x, y,K, θ) =

RE(x) +RS(y) + θ if y > 0 and K
θ if y = 0 and K
0 otherwise
(1)
where K denotes the capital required to start the enterprise, x is the input of the equity holder, and a
random component θ captures the uncertainty facing the firm. We abuse notation slightly and use θ as
both the random variable and its realisation. Input y is a critical input required for production, and it is
either sourced from an outside supplier or produced in-house by the firm. Note that input y is critical since115
the absence of y implies that there is no additional return from investing x. The convex cost functions for
x and y in the case of outsourcing are denoted by CE(x) and CS(y). We assume that C
′′′
E (x) ≥ 0, and
C ′′′S (y) ≥ 0. The key difference between outsourcing and in-house production is that the costs for x and
y in case of in-house production are φCE(x) and φCS(y) where φ > 1. That is, we assume that the costs
of production are greater when the input is produced in-house. The assumption that in-house production120
raises the cost of x and y equally by φ simplifies the analysis as it ensures that the optimal mix of x and
y remains the same with outsourcing and in-house production. However, our results remain unaffected if
instead we assume that the cost of y increases by φ with in-house production whereas the cost of x remains
unaffected.8 Furthermore, the input of the equity holders and the supplier is non-verifiable and consequently,
not contractible.125
We assume that the random variable θ, is distributed over [0,∞) according to a density function g(θ)
that is differentiable, and a corresponding cumulative distribution G(θ). The functions RE(x) and RS(y)
are assumed to be differentiable, increasing and concave in x and y respectively, with RE(0) = RS(0) = 0.
We assume that R′′′E (x) ≤ 0, and R′′′S (y) ≤ 0.9 We also assume that RS(y) satisfies the Inada condition:
limy→0R′S(y) = ∞. This is a sufficient (but not a necessary) condition that guarantees the optimality of130
giving the supplier incentives to provide input y. Finally, we assume that capital K fully depreciates at the
end of the period.
8Although a vertically integrated firm could reduce the transaction costs of procuring input from outside, the process may
also generate other costs due to losses in flexibility, and the sacrifice of gains from specialisation in stages of production. See
Buzzell (1983), Perry (1989) and Grossman and Helpman (2002). Lafontaine and Slade (2007) present evidence that suggests
that agency costs in the form of moral hazard may make vertical integration less attractive. Whether such costs dominate the
gains from vertical integration is an empirical question. We analyse the interesting case where strategic behaviour at the stage
of bankruptcy could force a firm to opt for vertical integration even when it is cheaper to procure the input from the market.
9The signs of the third derivatives of the revenue and the cost functions ensure that the desired second-order conditions in
the equity holders’ problem are satisfied.
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We consider a multi-stage contracting game of symmetric information10 with uncertainty. The game
involves a principal (equity holders) and two agents: the debt holders and the supplier.
2.1. Timeline135
The timeline, described in Figure 1, is as follows. At the start, the equity holders decide whether to
purchase the specialised input from the supplier or produce it in-house. The upper segment of the timeline
outlines events that unfold following the decision to buy the input from an outside supplier, which we
describe as “outsourcing”. The lower segment describes the events following the decision of the equity
holders to produce the input in-house, which is akin to vertical integration. We do not analyse the question140
of whether the supplier is “bought” by the equity holders and made to produce the input in a vertically
integrated set-up, or if the equity holders sets up an independent production unit for the input without
relying on the supplier’s machinery and skills. In our model, both interpretations are feasible and would
lead to the supplier being eliminated as a strategic player from the game.
2.1.0.1. Stage 0: Choice of in-house production or outsourcing. In Stage 0, the equity holders choose between145
outsourcing and in-house production.
2.1.0.2. Stage 1: Contract with the debt holders. In Stage 1, the equity holders make their financing decision.
In particular, we assume that the enterprise requires a fixed capital investment of K. The financing decision
involves the choice of capital structure and is summarised by the contract with the debt holders. This
contract specifies the level of debt, kD, and the corresponding payment of D to the debt holders. Both these150
are endogenously derived. The amount of investment made through equity is then given by kE = K−kD. The
capital market is assumed to be efficient, in the sense that there are no borrowing constraints.
2.1.0.3. Stage 2: Contract with the supplier. In case the equity holders choose outsourcing in Stage 0, in
Stage 2 they sign a contract with the supplier. They sign an incomplete contract that specifies that the
supplier will receive a share, 0 ≤ γ(θ) ≤ 1, of the surplus left over after the debt holders are paid, where155
the share itself may be state contingent and consequently depend on the realisation of θ. In addition to
profit sharing, they also agree on a side payment, w, to be paid at the signing of the contract. The contract
is therefore defined by the pair {γ(θ), w}, and is endogenously determined. The contract, however, cannot
specify precisely the amount of the inputs x and y as these are assumed to be non-contractible.
10The effects of asymmetric information on the firm’s capital structure have been discussed in the literature extensively. See
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leland and Pyle (1977).
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2.1.0.4. Stage 3: Realisation of uncertainty. At the “beginning” of Stage 3, uncertainty about θ is resolved160
(and is common knowledge). Then, after the realisation of θ, in the case of outsourcing, the equity holders
and the supplier simultaneously choose inputs x and y, respectively. The equity holders have to meet the
legal obligations to the claimants: a payment of D to the debt holders and a share γ(θ) of the profits to the
supplier. The outcome is constrained by the realised state of the world, the previously determined contracts
and the existing legal structure. Specifically, the threat points in this bargaining game and consequently its165
outcome, are affected by bankruptcy laws and in particular by the seniority of claims.11
There are three possible outcomes in equilibrium. First, if the firm can meet all of its obligations, we have
solvency. In this case, the overall game ends. On the other hand, if the firm’s terminal assets, R(x, y,K, θ) ≥
0, are insufficient to meet its obligations in full, the firm is in default and goes into bankruptcy.12 But, there
are two possible “types” of bankruptcy: strategic and non-strategic. Strategic bankruptcy occurs when an170
otherwise viable firm is forced into bankruptcy by the supplier. On the other hand, non-strategic bankruptcy
occurs if the firm cannot meet its obligations due to an unfavourable state of the world (low θ), even when
there is no opportunistic behaviour. In either case, if the firm goes into bankruptcy, its assets are distributed
in accordance with the seniority of claims. We assume that the debt holders are secured creditors (thus
first claimants), where their claim can be applied against RS(y) +RE(x) + θ. The supplier is an unsecured175
creditor, and the equity holders are residual claimants.
In the case of in-house production, the equity holders choose both x and y. In this case, there is no
question of the supplier strategically engineering bankruptcy. There is still the possibility of non-strategic
bankruptcy when the revenues of the firm fall below the claims of the debt holders. Just as with outsourcing,
we will see that this occurs when the realisation of θ is below an endogenously determined threshold.180
2.1.0.5. Stage 4: Post bankruptcy bargaining. With outsourcing, if bankruptcy occurs in Stage 3, the debt
holders and the supplier enter into post-bankruptcy bargaining. They decide on the level of the input y to
be supplied and determine the division extra surplus that is generated. This stage is absent in the case of
in-house production. A key assumption of our model when analysing the post-bankruptcy stage is that the
equity holders cannot form an alliance with any of the stakeholders (the supplier or the debt holders) in the185
11Bankruptcy laws in several jurisdictions have developed the “guidelines” that govern this bargaining process. The constraints
imposed by the bankruptcy rules and the parties’ relative strength in the bargaining process, determine the actual payoffs. For
example, according to the bankruptcy laws in the US and Canada (See Altman (1983), Willes and Willes (2003), White (1980)
and White (1989)), secured creditors receive the saleable value of the assets that are subject to security. If the value of the
security is insufficient to satisfy the claims, the secured creditor is entitled to claim the remainder as an unsecured creditor.
Unsecured assets are distributed, according to the US and Canadian laws in the following order: (i) administrative costs, (ii)
taxes, (iii) wages and rents, (iv) unsecured creditors, and finally (v) equity holders. If several claimants have the same priority,
they are paid on a pro-rata basis.
12See Titman (1984), White (1989), for examples of discussions of the corporate bankruptcy decision. See Aghion et al. (1992),
for a discussion of efficient bankruptcy procedures. See also Hart and Moore (1998) for a model of default with renegotiations.
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case of bankruptcy. We discuss this in section 5.2.
Stage 0
In-house or
outsource
In-house
production
Stage 1
Contract
with debt
holders: kD, D
Stage 2
No contract
with supplier
Stage 3 θ
realised and
x, y chosen
Low θ:
Bankruptcy
High θ:
Solvency
Outsourcing
Stage 1
Contract
with debt
holders: kD, D
Stage 2 Con-
tract with sup-
plier: γ(θ), w
Stage 3 θ
realised and
x, y chosen
Low θ:
Bankruptcy
Stage 4
Supplier and
debt holders
bargain and
y altered
High θ:
Solvency
Figure 1: Timeline
We now examine the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game by solving the game backwards.
In section 3, we analyse Stages 4 to 1 with outsourcing and in section 4 we do the same with in-house
production. Finally, in section 5, we analyse whether the equity holders outsource y or choose in-house
production.190
3. Outsourcing: Stages 4 to 1
3.1. Stage 4: Post bankruptcy bargaining
If bankruptcy occurs in Stage 3 (the condition under which this happens will be discussed below), the
debt holders and the supplier engage in post-bankruptcy bargaining in the last stage. Note that this stage
only arises with outsourcing. In this bargaining game, they renegotiate the input y to be supplied. We195
assume that the supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the debt holders.
With regards to the solution to this bargaining game, the threat payoff of the debt holders is θ since they
can get this even when the supplier supplies no input. When y is supplied, the gain from trade is given by
RS(y)− CS(y). Since the joint surplus, RS(y) + θ − CS(y), is maximised at
R′S(y
∗) = C ′S(y
∗), (2)
it is clear that the bargaining solution must be such that y = y∗. The payoffs of the supplier, the debt
9
holders, and the equity holders are respectively p(θ), D(θ) and e(θ) where
p(θ) = RS(y
∗)− CS(y∗), (3)
D(θ) = θ,
e(θ) = 0.
The existence of a region with strategic bankruptcy is robust to allowing the debt holders to have bargaining
power at the post-bankruptcy stage. We show this in Appendix Appendix B by introducing a parameter that200
captures bargaining power. The current formulation is the special case when bargaining power is allocated
entirely to the supplier which allows him to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the debt holders. As we explain
in the appendix, this is done for analytical tractability. The equity holders’ payoffs is 0 since bankruptcy
has occurred. If bankruptcy does not occur, the game ends in Stage 3.
3.2. Stage 3: Realisation of uncertainty205
The state of the world θ is revealed in the beginning of Stage 3. Thereafter the equity holders and
the supplier simultaneously choose x and y respectively. Finally, the payoffs and the firm’s solvency are
determined. If the firm can meet its obligations, the game ends in Stage 3. If, on the other hand, the firm
cannot meets its obligations, it goes into bankruptcy. Bankruptcy may or may not occur in this stage. If
the realisation of the state is very poor, the firm enters bankruptcy and the game continues as outlined in
the previous section. On the other hand, if both the supplier and equity holders expect solvency, then each
chooses his own input to maximise his own payoff, given their respective shares γ and 1− γ. In this case the
equity holders maximise
max
x
(1− γ)(RS(y) +RE(x) + θ −D)− CE(x). (4)
Similarly the supplier maximises:
max
y
γ(RS(y) +RE(x) + θ −D)− CS(y). (5)
Let x(γ) and y(γ) be the solutions to the first order conditions such that
(1− γ)R′E(x(γ)) = C ′E(x(γ)) and γR′S(y(γ)) = C ′S(y(γ)). (6)
Unique solutions x(γ) and y(γ) are guaranteed to exist by concavity of the revenue functions and convexity
of the costs.
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Finally, note that bankruptcy cannot be triggered when θ > D since the debt holders receive θ in the
post-bankruptcy negotiations, which cannot be greater than D, the amount they receive in case of solvency.13
We are now ready to characterise the possible equilibria in the sub games described in Stage 3 and 4.
Define vS(x, y; θ) := γ(RS(y) +RE(x) + θ −D)− CS(y),
and vE(x, y; θ) := (1− γ)(RS(y) +RE(x) + θ −D)− CE(x)
(7)
as the payoffs of the supplier and the equity holders in case of solvency with inputs x and y, and θ.210
Assumption 1. vS(x(γ), y(γ); θH) is non decreasing in γ.
This assumption ensures that the payoff of the supplier in the case of solvency is non-decreasing in the
share of the profits γ allocated to him. As we show in the following lemma, θH is the threshold of θ over which
the firm remains solvent. Note that production functions satisfying the Inada property of limx→0R′E(x) =∞
are not consistent with Assumption 1. This is because if RE(x) satisfies the Inada condition there would215
exist a γ < 1 such that vS(x(γ), y(γ); θH) > vS(x(1), y(1); θH).
Lemma 1. With outsourcing there exists θL < θH such that there is
a) non-strategic bankruptcy when θ ≤ θL,
b) strategic bankruptcy when θL < θ < θH , and
c) solvency when θH ≤ θ.220
Proof. All proofs can be found in Appendix Appendix A.
Figure 2 illustrates the result in Lemma 1. The lemma above partitions the production shock θ into
three regions. When θ ≥ θH , the firm has sufficient funds even in the absence of input by the supplier. As
a result, there is no bankruptcy. Since the supplier can ensure that RE(x) = RS(y) = 0 by withholding y,
we have θH = D. That is, when θ ≥ D, the firm can meet its debt obligation even in the absence of the
supplier’s input. Similarly, when θ ≤ θL the firm’s revenue is low enough such that the payoff of either the
supplier or the equity holders is negative from supplying y(γ) or x(γ) once the debt holders are paid off.
That is θL := max{θ} such that ;
either vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0,
or vS(0, y(γ); θ) ≤ 0 and vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0.
(8)
13The supplier does not threaten to withhold input y if θ > D since such a threat is not be credible. The supplier would have
payoff of zero if he were to carry out that threat, as the equity holders would pay D to the debt holders and keep the remaining
θ −D. The supplier is better off providing y and receiving vS > 0.
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We interpret this as a region where there is bankruptcy even without strategic behaviour by the supplier.
The novel region is θL < θ < θH when the supplier’s input is pivotal for ensuring solvency of the firm. In
this region, the supplier triggers bankruptcy to secure a higher payoff even though he receives a positive
payoff by ensuring solvency. In the following sections we describe each of these three possibilities.225
θ0 θL θH
Non-strategic
bankruptcy
Strategic
bankruptcy
Solvency
Figure 2: Outcomes for different values of θ with outsourcing
The equity holders choose their effort after the realisation of θ. Since they are aware that the supplier
withholds y when θ ≤ θH , it is an equilibrium for the equity holders in this region to choose x = 0. This is
because of the assumption that the supplier’s input is critical and therefore x = 0 is the best response when
y is withheld for θ ≤ θH . Although we focus on this equilibrium, we note that it may not be unique. It is
possible that equity holders may incentivise the supplier to not trigger strategic bankruptcy by choosing a230
high x > x(γ). This would make it profitable for the supplier to exert y(γ) as his payoff from complying with
the original contract would now be higher. In such an equilibrium, the interval of θ with strategic bankruptcy
would be smaller but would continue to exist since the equity holders have to ensure a payment of D to the
debt holders and a payment of RS(1) − CS(1) to the supplier. This is not feasible while maintaining zero
profit for the equity holders for low realisations of θ.14235
3.2.1. Solvency
The solvency region is when θH ≤ θ. If θ is large enough, the firm can always meet all its obligations to
claimants, regardless of how much of y is actually supplied. If the supplier withholds y he gets the contracted
share vS(x(γ), 0; θ) = γ(θ−D). But, by supplying y = y(γ), he receives an additional γRS(y(γ))−CS(y(γ)).
Hence y(γ) is chosen by the supplier as it is the optimal input for the supplier when he receives a share γ.
The payoff of the supplier, the debt holders, and the equity holders respectively is
p(θ) = vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ),
D(θ) = D,
e(θ) = vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ).
(9)
14We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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3.2.2. Strategic bankruptcy
Strategic bankruptcy occurs when θL < θ < θH . Within this region, the supplier can force the firm
into bankruptcy by not supplying his input, since this triggers a missing payment of D − θ > 0 to the debt
holders. To determine whether it is indeed in the interest of the supplier to exercise his option to force240
default, we compare his payoffs if he forces bankruptcy to when he does not. We know that if he forces
bankruptcy, he will move to post-bankruptcy bargaining with debt holders in Stage 4. In case of default,
at the end of post-bankruptcy bargaining he receives RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1)), since the optimal effort choice
in case of strategic bankruptcy derived earlier is y∗ = y(1). Due to Assumption 1, when θ < θH we have
RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1)) > vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) and consequently when θ < θH , the supplier is always better off245
actually forcing bankruptcy.
Thus, in this region the supplier first forces bankruptcy by first withholding y, and later in Stage 4 choose
y = y(1). The equity holders, anticipating that the supplier will force bankruptcy, supply x = 0 since the
supplier’s input is critical in production. The players’ payoffs are the same as the ones described in (3).
This case implies that, under some circumstances due to opportunistic behaviour, the firm will not be able250
to prevent bankruptcy, even if it is viable (in the sense that the firm can survive if y(γ) is supplied).
3.2.3. Non-strategic bankruptcy
When θ ≤ θL the firm will always default on its obligations to the debt holders, so that the equity
holders are out of the picture and we have x = 0. The supplier withholds y and the game moves to Stage
4, post-bankruptcy bargaining. Assuming that the sharing rule does not depend on whether the firm went255
bankrupt, or was forced into bankruptcy, the gains from trade and the outcome of bargaining will be the
same as the strategic bankruptcy case. That is y = y(1) and the payoff of parties is the one described in (3).
3.3. Stage 2: Contract with the supplier
In Stage 2, after the contract with the debt holders is signed in Stage 1, the equity holders sign a contract
with the supplier if outsourcing is used. This stage is absent with in-house production. The contract with260
the supplier specifies that he will provide his services and, in return, he will receive a share γ(θ) of the surplus
left over after the debt holders are paid and a side payment of w will be paid at the signing of the contract.
The input service, however, is non-verifiable so that the parties cannot sign a contract that is based on the
level of y. Rather than restricting the equity holders to only offering a constant share γ to the supplier, we
allow them to offer a share γ(θ) that is conditional θ since x and y are chosen after θ is realised.265
Consider the firm’s problem. Given the contract with the debt holders, the outcomes of the multilateral
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bargaining game and the supplier’s choice of y(γ), the equity holders’ receipt in the last stage will be
e(θ) =
 vE(x(γ(θ)), y(γ(θ)); θ) if solvency, and0 otherwise. (10)
The equity holders choose a sharing arrangement, that is the function γ(θ), and the fixed payment w that
maximises
E(e(θ))− w − ρEkE (11)
where ρEkE is the capital requirement that is funded through equity decided in Stage 1 (see section 3.4)
subject to the participation constraint of the supplier given by
E(p(θ)) + w ≥ 0
⇔ G(θH)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1))) +
∫∞
θH
vS(x(γ(θ)), y(γ(θ)); θ)g(θ)dθ + w ≥ 0.
(12)
The left hand side of the inequality in (12) is the pay-off of the supplier which is an expectation over
bankruptcy and solvency. As shown in (3), the first term is the payoff in the state of bankruptcy multiplied
by its probability. The second term is the conditional expectation of the supplier’s payoff in case of solvency,
as seen in (7).
Note that this is a functional analysis problem since the equity holders choose a function γ(θ) and a270
constant w that maximises their payoff. Since w can be used to extract all surplus from the supplier, (12)
must bind with equality and the maximisation problem can be analysed in two parts: First, the problem
of choosing γ(θ) that maximises the total surplus, and second, the problem of choosing w such that the
participation constraint of the supplier binds.
w is the constant component of the payment made to the supplier by the equity holders. This component275
is paid at Stage 2 when the contract with the supplier is signed. In equilibrium, w is always negative. This
implies that at Stage 2 the supplier makes a flat payment to the equity holders. This is because the contract
with the supplier is designed to give him incentives to supply y which is otherwise non-contractible. We
assume that the supplier is not financially constrained and can pay −w, and is willing to do so as long as he
recovers this in expectation (the inequality in (12)). The other component of the supplier’s payoff is γ(θ),280
the share of profit, that will be made in Stage 3 conditional on solvency, and the payoff the supplier receives
in the event of bankruptcy in Stage 4 when he negotiates with the debt holders. Taking expectations over
this component, the equity holders set w to push the supplier to his outside option of zero at the ex-ante
stage (Stage 2). We are now ready to characterise the choice of γ(θ) by the equity holders.
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Proposition 1. With outsourcing, the equity holders’ agreement with the supplier is characterised as follows.285
a) A unique constant γ∗ exists that is chosen by the equity holders.
b) The interior solution for γ∗ satisfies
1− γ∗
γ∗
= −R
′
E(x(γ
∗))
R′S(y(γ∗))
· x
′(γ∗)
y′(γ∗)
(13)
and this is increasing in the return to the supplier’s input, relative to the equity holders’ input.
This proposition establishes that the agreement between the equity holders and the supplier takes the
form of γ(θ) being a constant. This result arises from the additive separability of the firm’s revenue in θ.
The proposition shows that a unique γ exists that maximises the payoff of the equity holders. As expected,290
this is increasing in the returns from the input of the supplier – it is in the interest of the equity holders
to increase the supplier’s share as the supplier’s input is non-contractible and a greater γ induces a greater
input. Since the choice of inputs in case of solvency does not depend on the level of θ, γ(θ) is constant. The
equity holders will take γ∗ as given when they make their financing decision.
3.4. Stage 1: Contract with the debt holders295
In Stage 1, the equity holders sign a contract with the debt holders. The contract specifies the level debt
kD and the corresponding payment D. Note once again that, for an exogenously given K, the choice of kD
also determines the amount of capital funded through equity since kD+kE = K. The cost of equity financing
is therefore ρE(K − kD) where ρE > 0 represents the parameter capturing the cost of equity. Similarly the
interest rate available to the debt holders if they don’t invest in the enterprise is ρD > 0. We assume that300
ρE ≥ ρD.15 More generally ρDkD is the minimum principal and interest on debt kD.
The debt holders’ participation constraint is
ρDkD ≤ E(D(θ))
≤ ∫D
0
θg(θ)d(θ) + (1−G(D))D.
(14)
This participation constraint defines the market debt supply function.
Given the outcomes in Stages 2; 3; and 4, and noting that θH := D,we find that the equity holders’
15All our results for the case ρE = ρD also apply to the case when equity is cheaper than debt, that is, ρE < ρD.
15
receipts are given by
E(e(θ))− w − ρE(K − kD)
=
∫∞
D
(RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗)) + θ −D − CS(y(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗)))g(θ)dθ
+G(D)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)))− ρE(K − kD).
(15)
The equity holders choose a contract with the debt holders to maximise the expected net present value of
their receipts (15), subject to the debt holders’ participation constraint in (14), and the supplier’s incentive
constraint in (6). Note that since we used the supplier’s participation constraint from (12) in the derivation305
of (15), its satisfaction has already been imposed. Furthermore, the optimal contract with the supplier,
that is, γ = γ∗, w = −E(p(θ)), has also already been taken into account in the derivation of (15). The
equity holders’ problem is therefore to maximise (15) with respect to kD and D subject to the participation
constraint of the debt holders in (14).
Again, it is clear that the optimal solution does not leave extra surplus for the debt holders. In other
words, their participation constraint will hold with strict equality. That is
E(D(θ)) = ρDkD (16)
If we substitute this strict participation constraint into (15) by substituting for kD we get expected net
present value of equity which the equity holders maximise;
max
D
E(e(θ)) + E(p(θ))− ρE
(
K − E(D(θ))
ρD
)
. (17)
This is the expected net present value of the firm. The first term E(e(θ)) represents the net payoff of the310
equity holders. This is the equity holders’ share of revenue net of the payment to the debt holders in case
of solvency, and net of the cost of x(γ). Similarly, the second term E(p(θ)) is the supplier’s net expected
payoff. The last term is the cost of equity financing ρE times the amount of capital financed through equity.
When the entire capital requirement K is financed through debt, the last term equals zero as kD = K, and
the payments to the debt holders are subtracted from E(e(θ)) and E(p(θ)). On the other hand, when capital315
is fully financed through equity then E(D(θ)) = 0 and consequently E(e(θ)) and E(p(θ)) are correspondingly
larger as no payment is made to the debt holders. Since the equity holders push both the debt holders and
the supplier to their outside options in Stage 1 and 2 respectively, the expression in (17) represents the net
ex-ante surplus generated by the firm.
Proposition 2. With outsourcing,320
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a) when ρE > ρD and the objective function is concave, there is a unique optimal k
∗
D ∈ [0,K].
b) when ρE = ρD, the probability of an opportunistic bankruptcy is zero and the optimal capital structure is
k∗D = 0 and all capital is financed through equity.
The proposition above gives us an important property of the optimal capital structure, that there is no
debt financing and consequently no strategic bankruptcy in equilibrium, when debt is as expensive as equity.
In this case, there is no strategic bankruptcy as there is no debt to trigger default. The proposition also
characterises what the optimal capital structure for the firm is. Define
∆TS := RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))− (RS(y(1))− CS(y(1))) (18)
as the increase in the net surplus generated from the equilibrium inputs from the supplier and equity holders
as we move from bankruptcy to solvency. When the solution to (17) is interior, D∗ is characterised by the
first order condition;
(ρE − ρD)(1−G(D∗))−∆TSg(D∗)ρD = 0. (19)
The second-order condition that guarantees concavity is derived in the proof of the proposition in the ap-
pendix. Since the participation constraint of the debt holders binds, there is a positive monotonic relationship
between k∗D and D
∗. In particular, from equation (16) we have
ρDk
∗
D =
∫ D∗
0
θg(θ)dθ +D∗(1−G(D∗)) and ∂k
∗
D
∂D∗
=
1−G(D∗)
ρD
> 0. (20)
Therefore the properties of D∗ that we derive also apply to k∗D which is the level of debt financing.
Equation (19) shows the trade-off behind the optimal choice of financial structure. The left hand side is325
the gain resulting from cheaper debt financing times the probability that the firm is solvent. The cost of debt
financing is the loss of the extra surplus due to bankruptcy times the increase in the probability of strategic
bankruptcy that such extra debt induces. As such, this is the key trade-off between choosing to finance
the firm’s capital requirement through debt vs. equity. First, note that an interior solution obtains only if
ρE > ρD. When debt is cheaper than equity, on the one hand by marginally increasing D, and therefore330
kD, which is the capital financed through debt, the firm makes a lower payment relative to equity financing.
This is captured in the first term (ρE − ρD)(1−G(D∗)). On the other hand, increasing D and therefore kD
introduces the possibility of costly strategic bankruptcy. In particular, strategic bankruptcy leads to zero
input by the equity holders and consequently a loss of surplus of ∆TS. D∗ is the value of D that balances
this trade-off. Hence optimal debt is determined by the trade-off between cheaper debt on the one hand and335
the surplus lost due to strategic bankruptcy on the other. This is illustrated in the example below.
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3.4.0.1. Example. If θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, θ], we can rewrite the first order condition
from (19) as
(ρE − ρD)
(
1− D∗
θ
)
= ρD
∆TS
θ
(21)
⇔ D∗ = θ − ρDρE−ρD∆TS. (22)
We observe that the optimal debt depends negatively on the cost of debt ρD, positively on the cost of equity
ρE , and negatively on ∆TS; the incremental surplus lost in strategic bankruptcy.340
∆TS itself depends on basic parameters like costs of inputs provided by the equity holders and the
supplier. Moreover, with a general distribution of θ, the properties of the distribution such as its mean
and variance will also affect the optimal level of debt. The proposition below derives the impact of these
underlying parameters on the equilibrium debt in the form of comparative statics that form the basis of the
testable implications of this paper.345
Proposition 3. Assume the interior solution to D∗ obtains.
a) Let distribution of θ improve from G(·) to F (·) with the corresponding densities g(·) and f(·), with F (·)
dominating G(·) in the sense of the monotone hazard-rate condition (MHRC)
f(θ)
1− F (θ) ≤
g(θ)
1−G(θ) ∀θ. (23)
Then
D∗(F (·)) ≥ D∗(G(·)) (24)
b) When the marginal cost of inputs x and y is constant at cE and cS respectively, then
∂D∗
∂cE
≥ 0 and ∂D
∗
∂cS
≤ 0. (25)
This proposition shows some comparative statics results that shed light on how the capital structure of
the firm varies with the environment. Part a) of the proposition shows that as the distribution of θ improves
in the sense of the MHRC, the debt-equity ratio increases.16
Note that MHRC implies first order stochastic dominance. This in turn implies second order stochastic350
dominance. Hence if F (·) dominates G(·) in the MHRC sense, then it must also dominate G(·) in the first and
16Since total capital requirement K is constant, an increase in D implies an increase in kD and an increase in the debt-equity
ratio kD
K−kD .
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second order stochastic dominance sense.17 A decrease in the hazard rate f(θ)1−F (θ) implies that the realisation
of the random component of the cash flow is more likely to be inclined towards the better states, and this
reduces the probability and expected costs associated with strategic bankruptcy. Since the hazard rate bears
a negative relationship with the riskiness of cash flow, our model predicts an inverse relationship between355
the riskiness of cash flow and optimal debt-equity ratio.
Part b) of the proposition shows how the capital structure of the firm changes in the cost of inputs for
the equity holders and the supplier. We see that D∗ and therefore k∗D, which is the level of capital financed
through debt, is increasing in the marginal cost of the equity holders’ input and decreasing in the marginal
cost of the supplier’s input. As the equity holders’ input becomes more expensive, it becomes more attractive360
to rely on the supplier’s input. This reduces the cost of strategic bankruptcy which is a state where only the
supplier makes an input as the equity holders are shut out. Therefore D∗ increases; increasing the likelihood
of strategic bankruptcy. Conversely, as the input of the supplier becomes costlier, it becomes more attractive
to rely on the input of the equity holders, and the state of strategic bankruptcy where only the supplier
provides an input, becomes less attractive. Therefore D∗ decreases; reducing the likelihood of strategic365
bankruptcy.
Finally, it is worth summarising the general predictions and empirical implications of the model. Our
model identifies a new cost of debt financing. This new cost is due to two factors:
1. The probability of opportunistic behaviour leading to strategic bankruptcy G(D∗)−G(θL).
2. The firm cannot control the potential post-bankruptcy arrangement between the supplier and the debt370
holders.
Due to this new cost, the firm faces a new consideration that tends to limit its use of debt. Since, in
general, there are other motives for using debt, our conclusion simply implies that under these conditions,
the debt-equity ratio will tend to be lower. At the same time, it is important to remember that it is the
incompleteness of the contract with the supplier that facilitates opportunistic behaviour in the first place.375
4. In-house production Stages 3 to 1
Note that there is no Stage 4 and Stage 2 with in-house production as the supplier is absent (see Figure
1). Hence we can focus on Stage 3 and Stage 1.
17See Proposition 4.3 in Wolfstetter (2002).
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4.1. Stage 3: Realisation of uncertainty
Once θ is realised, as there is no supplier, the equity holders’ problem is
max
x,y
RE(x) +RS(y) + θ −D − φCE(x)− φCS(y). (26)
The positive optimal in-house (i) inputs xi, yi as the values of x and y that satisfy the first order conditions
R′E(xi) = φC
′
E(xi) and R
′
S(yi) = φC
′
S(yi). (27)
Hence the solution to the equity holders’ problem is to choose
x∗, y∗ =
 xi, yi if RE(xi) +RS(yi) + θ −D − φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) ≥ 00, 0 otherwise. (28)
With this we can characterise the outcomes in Stage 3 with in-house production.380
Lemma 2. With in-house production there exists a θB such that there is
a) non-strategic bankruptcy when θ < θB, and
b) solvency when θB ≤ θ.
Figure 3 illustrates the result in Lemma 2. The characterisation with in-house production is similar to
that of outsourcing with the exception that there is no supplier to engineer bankruptcy. With in-house385
production, there are two possibilities that we discuss below.
θ0 θB
Non-strategic
bankruptcy
Solvency
Figure 3: Outcomes for different values of θ with in-house production
Since θB is defined as the non-strategic bankruptcy threshold with in-house production we have
θB = max{0, D + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi)−RE(xi)−RS(yi)}. (29)
It is easy to see that θB is lower than θH , the strategic bankruptcy threshold with outsourcing since θH = D
and φCE(xi) + φCS(yi) − RE(xi) − RS(yi) < 0. The comparison between θB and θL, the non-strategic
bankruptcy threshold with outsourcing, is less obvious. If outsourcing generates more surplus relative to
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in-house production, then θL < θB . Intuitively, this is because for the same realisation of θ, outsourcing390
generates more profit than in-house production making the threshold for bankruptcy lower with outsourcing.
This occurs if inequality in (36) is satisfied as discussed below. On the other hand, if in-house production
generates a larger surplus, we will have θL > θB .
4.1.1. Solvency
If the realisation of θ is high enough (greater than θB), such that the revenues of the firm are sufficient to
meet the debt holders’ claim of D, the firm remains solvent. In this case the payoffs of the debt and equity
holders are
D(θ) = D
e(θ) = RE(xi) +RS(yi) + θ −D − φCE(xi)− φCS(yi),
(30)
respectively.395
4.1.2. Non-strategic bankruptcy
If the realisation of θ is low enough (less than θB), such that the revenues of the firm are insufficient to
meet the debt holders’ claim of D, the firm goes bankrupt. In this case, the payoffs of the debt and equity
holders are
D(θ) = θ
e(θ) = 0,
(31)
respectively.
4.2. Stage 1: Contract with the debt holders
Given the outcomes in Stages 2; 3; and 4, and noting that θB := D−RE(xi)−RS(yi)+φCE(xi)+φCS(yi),
the equity holders’ receipts are given by
E(e(θ))− ρE(K − kD)
=
∫∞
θB
(RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) + θ −D)g(θ)dθ − ρE(K − kD).
(32)
Again, it is clear that the optimal solution does not leave extra surplus for the debt holders. In other words,
their participation constraint will hold with strict equality. That is,
E(D(θ)) =
∫ θB
0
θg(θ)dθ + (1−G(θB))D = ρDkD. (33)
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If we substitute this strict participation constraint into (32) by substituting for kD we find that the expected
net present value of equity that the equity holders maximise is
max
D
E(e(θ))− ρE
(
K − E(D(θ))
ρD
)
. (34)
The first term E(e(θ)) represents the net payoff of the equity holders in the case of in-house production. It
is composed of the revenue of the firm net of the payment to the debt holders in the case of solvency, and400
the cost of xi and yi. The last term is the cost of equity financing ρE times the amount of capital financed
through equity. Higher debt financing leads to larger payment to the debt holders reducing E(e(θ)) whereas
higher equity financing increases E(e(θ)) and reduces E(D(θ)). Comparing this to the analogous expression
for the case of outsourcing presented in (17), we see that the payment to the supplier is absent since now
the input y is produced in-house. We can now characterise the choice of financing with in-house production.405
Proposition 4. With in-house production,
a) when ρE > ρD and the objective function is concave, there is a unique optimal k
∗
D ∈ [0,K].
b) only equity financing is chosen when ρE = ρD.
The second-order condition that guarantees concavity is derived in the proof of the proposition in the
appendix. We observe that even with in-house production, the choice of financing doesn’t just depend on410
whether ρE > ρD. This is because even with in-house production there are realisations of θ, in particular
when θ < θB , when sub-optimal x = y = 0 is chosen. This is reminiscent of Myers (1977) where under-
investment occurs when the equity holders cannot renegotiate the existing debt. This would change if we
instead assume that the equity holders can renegotiate with the debt holders in a way that the equity holders
can retain the net returns from their input x and y namely RE(x) + RS(y)− φCE(x)− φCS(y). With this415
modification, the efficient level of x = xi and y = yi will always be provided. Moreover, capital will either
be financed only through debt, if ρE > ρD, or only through equity, if ρE = ρD. All other results will remain
qualitatively unchanged. We rule out such renegotiation between the equity and the debt holders to maintain
consistency: since this is what we have also assumed about outsourcing.
5. Stage 0: In-house production or outsourcing420
In this section, the equity holders choose between in-house production and outsourcing of the critical
input y. First, we show how equity and debt financing varies with their costs.
Proposition 5. With both outsourcing and in-house production, the debt-equity ratio is weakly increasing
in ρEρD , the relative cost of financing through equity.
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This shows that as the relative cost of equity increases, the amount of debt financing relative to equity425
financing increases. Next, we analyse how the capital structure varies with ρEρD with outsourcing and in-house
production. To ease the analysis we assume:
Assumption 2.
RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) ≥ ρDK.
This implies that with in-house production, the firm remains solvent regardless of the realisation of θ. Note
however that strategic bankruptcy with outsourcing continues to remain possible: since this occurs whenever
θ < D. We can now characterise the equity holders’ decision of outsourcing and in-house production. To
begin with note that when
RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) > RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗)) (35)
in-house production will always be preferred over outsourcing since the payoff from outsourcing even when
the firm is solvent, is weakly lower than in-house production. Similarly if
RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)) > RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi), (36)
then outsourcing will be preferred over the in-house production of y since the payoff from outsourcing is
greater even in the event of bankruptcy. The interesting parameter space is in the intermediate range when
the payoff from outsourcing, relative to in-house production, is greater in the event of solvency, but lower430
in case of bankruptcy. Focusing on this region allows us to highlight the trade-off between choosing the
more efficient outsourcing on the one hand, and the more strategic bankruptcy proof in-house production
on the other. The other obvious benefit of in-house production is that it eliminates the problem of having
to give incentives to an external supplier (in the form of share γ in our model). If the efficiency gains
from eliminating this incentive problem are sufficiently large, in-house production would be preferred over435
outsourcing even in the absence of strategic bankruptcy caused by opportunistic behaviour by the supplier
in case of outsourcing.
We now turn to the choice of outsourcing versus in-house production in the non-trivial case when out-
sourcing is not always preferred over in-house production or vice versa.
Proposition 6. When440
a) ρE = ρD, outsourcing is preferred over in-house production
b) ρE > ρD there exists a threshold K such that the firm chooses in-house production when K ≥ K and
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Row ρD < ρE K < K θH ≤ θ Production of y Financing Organisational outcome
1 7 – – Outsource Equity Supplier-Equity holders
2 3 7 – In-house Debt Equity-Debt holders
3 3 3 7 Outsource Mix Supplier-Debt holders
4 3 3 3 Outsource Mix All three parties
Table 1: Financing and organisational design outcomes
outsourcing when K < K.
Proposition 6 characterises how the equity holders choose between outsourcing and the in-house pro-
duction of y. The intuition for the result is the following. If the capital requirement is financed entirely445
with equity, the supplier cannot benefit by triggering bankruptcy and therefore equity financing eliminates
strategic bankruptcy. It is therefore the preferred mode of financing when ρE = ρD, that is when equity
is as cheap as debt. We see this in Row 1 of Table 1, which summarises the financing and organisational
outcomes of the model. We see that the equity holders choose outsourcing and rely completely on equity
when ρE = ρD.450
When ρE > ρD, the equity holders face a trade-off. Although debt is attractive because it is cheaper, it
creates the problem of strategic behaviour by the supplier which causes bankruptcy. This tension is resolved
in one of two ways: If K is small enough, the equity holders choose outsourcing and typically finance it
with a mix of equity and low levels of debt as seen in Rows 3-4 of Table 1. This is because the cost of
using expensive equity is increasing in the level of capital requirement. In this case, if the realisation of θ is455
high enough (Row 4), the interests of all three stakeholders are aligned with maximising the firm value, and
strategic bankruptcy is avoided in an outcome that we can think of one where the interests of all stakeholders
aligned. If the realisation of θ is low enough (Row 3), the supplier triggers strategic bankruptcy.
If, on the other hand, the capital requirement K is large, then the attraction of cheap debt induces the
equity holders to choose the less efficient in-house production as seen in Row 2 of Table 1. Although in-house460
production is less efficient, it solves the problem of opportunistic behaviour by the supplier.
5.1. Discussion of results
We now summarise the mechanics of our model. Ex-ante the equity holders choose γ = γ∗ as the supplier’s
share of revenue. Once θ is realised, there are two possibilities. If θ ≥ D there are sufficient funds to pay the
debt holders and the contract that is made ex-ante can be enforced. If however θ < D, the supplier’s effort465
is needed to ensure solvency and we assume that this shifts the bargaining power to the supplier, allowing
him to pick γ = 1.
Here are some implications of the model:
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1) The possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the supplier in the case of distress implies that the equilib-
rium capital structure is not the first best. In particular, there exists a range where ρE > ρD, and though470
debt is cheaper, equity financing is chosen to eliminate the possibility of strategic bankruptcy.
2) The first best is feasible only when ρE = ρD: that is when equity is as cheap as debt. When ρE > ρD,
there is one of two inefficiencies:
(a) The equilibrium mix of debt and equity is not efficient as the firm moves away from cheap debt
towards costly equity to remove the debt holders so that the supplier cannot benefit through strategic475
bankruptcy, or
(b) The equity holders substitute away from more efficient outsourcing to less efficient in-house produc-
tion, in order to remove the (efficient) supplier from the picture.
3) The distribution of θ affects whether input y is produced in-house or outsourced. For instance, if G(θH) =
0, there is no threat of strategic bankruptcy and the equity holders will choose outsourcing. As seen in480
Proposition 3, as the distribution of θ improves in the first order stochastic dominance sense, the likelihood
of strategic default decreases, allowing the firm to increase the level of debt.
4) Our analysis suggests the following interpretation of bankruptcy: Bankruptcy is the only mechanism
through which departure from the agreed upon allocations can be achieved. In particular, bankruptcy
makes it possible for the supplier to increase his share of the payoff from the initially contracted upon485
γ∗ < 1 to 1. Total payoff decreases as a result of the equity holders’ zero investment in such case, but the
supplier’s payoff nonetheless increases. Note that the debt holders’ payoff too decreases. We see this since
vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ) and vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) are both positive for θL ≤ θ ≤ θH . This implies that the surplus in
the case x(γ) and y(γ) are chosen, is large enough to permit the servicing of debt. Yet the debt holders’
receive θ ≤ θH = D. As such, the debt holders do not profit from bankruptcy.18 Of course, the debt490
holders will not benefit from a regime where strategic bankruptcy is exogenously ruled out since their
interest payment would adjust downwards to reflect the improvement in the probability of repayment.
5.2. Discussion of assumptions
Finally, before we conclude, it is worthwhile considering the role of the specific assumptions that are built
into the set-up we have considered here.495
The key assumption of this paper is that it is the supplier (in the case of outsourcing) that has an option
to enter an agreement with the debt holders to eliminate the existing equity holders and to effectively become
the new owner. This implies that there is no possibility of ex-post renegotiation between the supplier and
18However, in Appendix Appendix B we show that the debt holders receive a payoff greater than θ from bankruptcy when
they are endowed with some bargaining power.
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the equity holders. A deal where the equity holders provide input x creates room for renegotiations over the
extra surplus that the two parties (equity holders and the suppliers) bring to the table. This would eliminate500
the possibility of strategic bankruptcy without affecting the region where non-strategic bankruptcy occurs.
Similarly, the paper also assumes no renegotiation between the equity and debt holders. In the case of
in-house production, allowing for renegotiation between these two stakeholders will eliminate the inefficiency
resulting from bankruptcy but will not change the inefficiency that results from the suboptimal production
of input y in-house. Hence, introduction of renegotiation will not affect our results qualitatively in the505
case of in-house production, and will in fact make inefficient in-house production more attractive relative to
efficient outsourcing. On the other hand, in case of outsourcing, renegotiation between the equity and debt
holders will not affect our results at all due to the critical nature of input y in the production process –
with outsourcing, the equity and debt holders cannot generate any surplus without the participation of the
supplier.510
One of our primary objectives is to explain the empirical phenomena of “debt conservatism” among the
firms that are dependent on the supply of critical and non-substitutable inputs. In our set-up, this is achieved
by endowing the supplier with some power in renegotiations as he can affect the size of the surplus by varying
the supply of the specialised input. However, one may argue that equity holders could also participate in the
ex-post alliance with the supplier and the debt holders. Effectively our model assumes that there are frictions515
when it comes to the participation of the equity holders in such an ex-post alliance. This assumption may
be justified on the following additional grounds.
In our model, parties can negotiate with each other once, but not renegotiate once the agreement reached
with earlier negotiations is vitiated by one of the parties.19 In keeping with this, the equity holders are allowed
to enter into an agreement with the supplier (γ(θ)) and debt holders (D∗). However, once a node is reached520
where one of the parties has not complied with its commitment to this agreement, the resulting breakdown
cannot be cured by renegotiation. Consequently, once the supplier reneges on the input he has agreed on, we
assume that the equity holders cannot in good faith negotiate with him at the post-bankruptcy stage. This
however does not affect possible negotiations between the supplier and debt holders as their relationship has
not been subject to the breakdown of a previous agreement and hence the two can negotiate with a clean525
slate. Our model may therefore apply to situations where breakdown of an agreement, particularly due to
opportunistic behaviour by one of the parties, creates frictions that impede renegotiations between the same
parties.
In a general model, we may expect that there is a distribution of frictions from which nature picks the
19We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of reasoning.
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realisation. Realised frictions determine the cost of tripartite negotiations at the node where bankruptcy is530
triggered.20 In the case of low frictions, the three parties would negotiate leading to the efficient outcome.
The inefficiency associated with strategic bankruptcy would disappear. In this case, working backwards,
the ex-ante choice between debt and equity would simplify to picking the cheaper option. On the other
hand, in case of high frictions, tripartite negotiations will not be feasible. Our model can be viewed as a
special case of such a general model when the distribution of frictions is such that tripartite negotiations535
are never feasible. As this distribution of frictions improves (leading to lower realised frictions), strategic
bankruptcy becomes less likely and the model converges to a Modigliani-Miller world with parity between
debt and equity financing when ρD = ρE . Of course if debt is cheaper than equity, that is ρD < ρE , then
with sufficiently low frictions only debt financing will be used.
We have also made two other assumptions in the paper to meet our primary objective of establishing debt540
conservatism and the choice of firm boundaries. First, that debt is cheaper than equity, and second, that in-
house production is costlier than outsourcing the production of the input y. The first assumption, discussed
in Footnote 6, is made to ensure an interior solution in the optimal debt-equity ratio. In the absence of
this, equity would always be preferred over debt. The second assumption, discussed in Footnote 8, is made
to ensure the presence of a trade-off between outsourcing and in-house production. In the absence of this545
assumption, in-house production would always be preferred over outsourcing leading to the elimination of
strategic bankruptcy.
6. Conclusion
We have addressed the issue of stakeholder behaviour during bankruptcy and the impact this has on the
ex-ante choice of capital structure and the choice of outsourcing or the in-house production of a critical input.550
We have shown that both decisions are influenced by the risk and cost associated with a strategic bankruptcy
that is triggered by the supplier. Due to friction in the contracting environment, namely the inability of the
equity holders to control the behaviour of other stakeholders after bankruptcy, the equity holders choose a
capital structure and firm boundaries to minimise the effect of ex-post strategic stakeholder behaviour. In
particular, if the endogenous strategic bankruptcy costs are too high, one of two things happens:555
1. The firm shuts out the supplier and produces the critical input in-house, even though the cost of
in-house production is greater than outsourcing.
2. The firm shuts out the debt holders and funds the capital requirement through more expensive equity.
20There are other constraints on debt renegotiations discussed in the literature. The debt holders may commit ex-ante to not
renegotiate the terms of the loan with the equity holders to prevent the latter from defaulting in a repeated relationship as in
Hart and Moore (1998).
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Since strategic bankruptcy is the central theme of our paper, it would be interesting to examine how
bankruptcy laws in different countries affect strategic stakeholder behaviour. For example, a Chapter 11560
restructuring in the United States allows for an automatic stay on payments of interests, emergency loan
provision (debtor-in-possession financing), and a cram-down of reorganisation plans by judges on stakehold-
ers. Our model predicts that such provisions may affect both the capital structure and the degree of vertical
integration. It may be interesting to investigate this empirically in future work.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall that
vS(x, y; θ) := γ(RS(y) +RE(x) + θ −D)− CS(y),
and vE(x, y; θ) := (1− γ)(RS(y) +RE(x) + θ −D)− CE(x)
(A.1)
where x(γ) and y(γ) are the solutions to the first-order conditions such that
(1− γ)R′E(x(γ)) = C ′E(x(γ)) and γR′S(y(γ)) = C ′S(y(γ)). (A.2)
Unique solutions x(γ) and y(γ) are guaranteed to exist by concavity of the revenue functions and convexity
of the costs.
Define θH := D and θL := max{θ} such that
either vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0,
or vS(0, y(γ); θ) ≤ 0 and vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0
(A.3)
implying
θL = max{ CS(y(γ))γ +D −RS(y(γ))−RE(x(γ)),
min{CS(y(γ))γ +D −RS(y(γ)), CE(x(γ))1−γ +D −RS(y(γ))−RE(x(γ))}}
(A.4)
Note first that θL < θH . This is because
vS(x(γ), y(γ);D) > 0 and vE(x(γ), y(γ);D) > 0. (A.5)
We can now analyse the three regions.645
• Non-strategic bankruptcy when θ ≤ θL.
1. vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0. When vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0, the supplier’s payoff from supplying positive
input is non-positive. Hence withholding y is optimal. When the supplier withholds y the payoff
of the equity holders is 0 (since θL < D) and hence x = 0 is optimal. Since θ ≤ θL < θH = D,
the profit of the firm is negative and it must go bankrupt.650
2. vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0 and vS(0, y(γ); θ) ≤ 0. When vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ) ≤ 0, the equity holders’
payoff from supplying positive input is non-positive. Hence x = 0 is optimal. When the equity
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holders supply x = 0 the payoff of the supplier is vS(0, y(γ); θ) ≤ 0 and hence withholding y is
optimal. Since θ ≤ θL < θH = D, the profit of the firm is negative and it must go bankrupt.
• Strategic bankruptcy when θL < θ < θH . We define strategic bankruptcy as the state of bankruptcy655
that is triggered by a less than optimal choice of y by the supplier in Stage 3. This is only possible
when θ < θH : since otherwise the debt holders are guaranteed their contractually obligated amount D.
The supplier’s payoff in Stage 4 at the end of post-bankruptcy negotiations with the debt holders is
RS(y(1))−CS(y(1)) from the expression in (3). On the other hand, the supplier’s payoff from supplying
y(γ) as per the contract with the equity holders is
vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) = γ(RE(x(γ)) +RS(y(γ)) + θ −D)− CS(y(γ)). (A.6)
At θ = θH = D, we see that vS(x(γ), y(γ); θH) < RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1)) by Assumption 1 since
vS(x(γ), y(γ); θH) is increasing in γ. Moreover, since vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) is increasing in θ, it follows
that RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1)), the payoff from triggering bankruptcy, is greater than vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) for660
all θ < θH . Finally, since the supplier withholds y when θ < θH , it follows that x = 0 is optimal since
the supplier’s input is critical in the production function described in equation (1).
• Solvency when θH ≤ θ. When θH ≤ θ, we have solvency as the debt holders receive full payment D, the
supplier receives p(θ) = vS(x(γ), y(γ); θ) > 0, and the equity holders receive e(θ) = vE(x(γ), y(γ); θ) >
0.665
Proof of Proposition 1. Since (12) binds with equality, and substituting for w in (11) the problem reduces
to choosing the function γ(θ) such that
max
γ(θ)
∫∞
θH
(RS(y(γ(θ))) +RE(x(γ(θ))) + θ −D − CS(y(γ(θ)))− CE(x(γ(θ))))g(θ)dθ
+G(θH)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)))− ρE(K − kD).
(A.7)
The first-order condition for this maximisation problem is
(R′S(y(γ(θ)))− C ′S(yγ(θ)))y′(γ(θ)) + (R′E(x(γ(θ)))− C ′E(x(γ(θ))))x′(γ(θ)) = 0. (A.8)
Note that RS(y), CS(y), RE(x) and CE(x) are unaffected by the value of θ. Moreover, the optimal x(γ) and
y(γ) defined in (A.2) are also independent of θ. Consequently, conditional on the supplier complying with
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the contract with the equity holders, the realisation of θ does not affect the choice of efforts x and y. This
implies that γ(θ) must be a constant γ∗.670
We know that the first-order condition for the choice of x by the equity holders and y for the supplier
will hold. This implicitly defines x(γ∗) and y(γ∗) with
γ∗R′S(y(γ
∗)) = C ′S(y(γ
∗)) and (1− γ∗)R′E(x(γ∗)) = C ′E(x(γ∗)). (A.9)
The second-order condition is
(R′′S(y(γ))− C ′′S(y(γ)))y′(γ)2 + (R′S(y(γ))− C ′S(y(γ)))y′′(γ)
+(R′′E(x(γ))− C ′′E(x(γ)))x′(γ)2 + (R′E(x(γ))− C ′E(x(γ)))x′′(γ) < 0.
(A.10)
We can check that this is satisfied: First, note that R′′S(y)− C ′′S(y) and R′′E(x)− C ′′E(x) are negative by the
concavity of the revenue functions and the convexity of the cost functions. Next, note that y′(γ)2 and x′(γ)2
are always positive. This implies that the first and the third term in (A.10) must be negative. Next, note
that R′S(y(γ))−C ′S(y(γ)) must be positive since γR′S(y(γ)) = C ′S(y(γ)), and similarly R′E(x(γ))−C ′E(x(γ))
since (1 − γ)R′E(x(γ)) = C ′E(x(γ)) by the first order condition in (A.2). For the final step we show that
x′′(γ) and y′′(γ) are negative. Using the first-order conditions that define x(γ), y(γ) in (A.2) we can derive
x′(γ), y′(γ), x′′(γ) and y′′(γ). These are
x′(γ) =
R′E(x(γ))
(1− γ)R′′E(x(γ))− C ′′E(x(γ))
< 0, y′(γ) = − R
′
S(y(γ))
γR′′S(y(γ))− C ′′S(y(γ))
> 0, (A.11)
x′′(γ) =
−2R′′E(x)x′(γ) + x′(γ)2((1− γ)R′′′E (x)− C ′′′E (x))
C ′′E(x)− (1− γ)R′′E(x)
< 0 (A.12)
and
y′′(γ) =
2R′′S(y)y
′(γ) + y′(γ)2(γR′′′S (y)− C ′′′S (y))
C ′′S(y)− γR′′S(y)
< 0. (A.13)
R′′′E (x) ≤ 0, R′′′S (y) ≤ 0, C ′′′S (y) ≥ 0 and C ′′′E (x) ≥ 0 by the assumptions we have made about the production
and the cost functions. Therefore the solution found for γ∗ in (A.8) is the unique maximum.
Using the first-order conditions in (A.9) we can substitute for C ′E(x(γ)) and C
′
S(y(γ)) in (A.8) and we
get
1− γ∗
γ∗
= − R
′
E(x(γ
∗)
R′S(y(γ∗))
· x
′(γ∗)
y′(γ∗)
. (A.14)
Note that −x′(γ∗)y′(γ∗) ≥ 0 since x′(γ) ≤ 0. Holding −x
′(γ∗)
y′(γ∗) constant, note that the value of γ
∗ is increasing in675
R′E(x(γ
∗)
R′S(y(γ
∗)) , which is the return from the equity holders’ input relative to the supplier’s input.
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The assumption that RS(y) satisfies the Inada condition ensures that the first-order condition in (A.8)
is greater than 0 at γ = 0. If the condition is always greater than 0, then the solution to γ∗ is 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the case when ρEρD = ρ > 1. From (17), the equity holders’s problem is to
max
D
∫∞
D
(RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗)) + θ + (ρ− 1)D − CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))) g(θ)dθ
+
∫D
0
(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)) + ρθ) g(θ)dθ − ρEK.
(A.15)
This yields the following first-order condition
(ρ− 1)(1−G(D∗))− (RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))−RS(y(1)) + CS(y(1)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆TS
g(D∗) = 0.
(A.16)
The second-order condition for the problem to be concave is
−(ρ− 1)g(D∗)− g′(D∗)∆TS ≤ 0. (A.17)
We only consider the case when the objective function is concave. The objective function is concave when
g′(θ) ≥ 0 or ∆TS ≤ − (ρ− 1)g(θ)
g′(θ)
. (A.18)
With concavity, there are three possible sub cases to consider.
1. If (ρ − 1)(1 − G(D)) − ∆TSg(D) < 0 for all D, then k∗D = 0 and the entire capital K is financed680
through equity.
2. If (ρ − 1)(1 − G(D)) − ∆TSg(D) > 0 for all D, then k∗D = K and the entire capital K is financed
through debt.
3. If there exists a D that satisfies (ρ − 1)(1 − G(D)) − ∆TSg(D) = 0, then there is a unique interior
solution to D (by concavity) and k∗D ∈ (0,K).685
Next consider the case when ρE = ρD the equity holders’ maximisation problem in (17) simplifies to
choosing D to maximise
(1−G(D)) (RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗)))
+G(D) (RS(y(1))− CS(y(1))) +
∫∞
0
θg(θ)dθ − ρEK.
(A.19)
This is a linear programming problem in D. Note that y(1) = y(γ = 1). Since RS(y(γ
∗)) + RE(x(γ∗)) −
CS(y(γ
∗)) − CE(x(γ∗)) > RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1)) by the optimality of γ = γ∗, the optimal D∗ = 0 implying
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k∗D = 0 by (16) and all of capital K is fully financed by equity.
Proof of Proposition 3. Defining ρEρD =: ρ, the first-order condition in (19) can be rearranged to
g(D∗)
1−G(D∗) =
ρ− 1
∆TS
(A.20)
where the right hand side is independent of the distribution of θ.
We will first prove part a) of the proposition. To begin with, note that F (·) and G(·) must individually
satisfy the MHRC since (A.17) the second-order condition for D∗ that ensures concavity is
−(ρ− 1)g(D∗)− g′(D∗)∆TS ≤ 0
Since the second-order condition is satisfied by assumption, we find that g(D
∗)
1−G(D∗) and
f(D∗)
1−F (D∗) are both
increasing in D∗. Moreover by the first-order condition we have
f(D∗(F (·)))
1− F (D∗(F (·))) =
g(D∗(G(·)))
1−G(D∗(G(·))) =
ρ− 1
∆TS
, (A.21)
and consequently D∗(F (θ)) ≥ D∗(G(θ)) because F (·) dominates G(·) in the MHRC sense by assumption,
that is
f(D∗)
1− F (D∗) ≤
g(D∗)
1−G(D∗) ∀D
∗. (A.22)
We now turn to part b) note that
∂∆TS
∂cS
= ((R′S(y(γ
∗))− cS))y′(γ∗) + (R′E(x(γ∗))− cE)x′(γ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
0 by FOC for γ in (A.8)
∂γ
∂cS
− y(γ)
− (R′S(y(1))− cS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0 by FOC for y(1) in (2)
·∂y(1)∂cS + y(1)
= y(1)− y(γ) ≥ 0,
(A.23)
since y(1) = y(γ = 1) ≥ y(γ). Similarly
∂∆TS
∂cE
= ((R′S(y(γ
∗))− cS))y′(γ∗) + (R′E(x(γ∗))− cE)x′(γ∗))︸ ︷︷ ︸
0 by FOC for γ in (A.8)
∂γ
∂cE
− x(γ) ≤ 0. (A.24)
Hence differentiating the FOC for D∗ in (19) and defining ρ := ρEρD we find that
∂D∗
∂cS
=
g(D∗)∂∆TS∂cS
(ρ− 1)g(D∗) + g′(D∗)∆TS ≥ 0 (A.25)
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and
∂D∗
∂cE
=
g(D∗)∂∆TS∂cE
(ρ− 1)g(D∗) + g′(D∗)∆TS ≤ 0. (A.26)
Note that the denominator in (A.25) and (A.26) is positive by the second-order condition for D∗ derived in690
(A.17).
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that xi, yi are the values of x and y that solve the first-order conditions
R′E(xi) = φC
′
E(xi) and R
′
S(yi) = φC
′
S(yi). (A.27)
Define
θB := max{0, D + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi)−RE(xi)−RS(yi)}. (A.28)
By inspection, we see that if θ < θB , the payoff of the equity holders from exerting any positive input is
negative. Hence x = y = 0 is optimal. In this case D > θ and consequently the firm must go bankrupt.
Similarly, when θB ≤ θ, we see that the payoff of the equity holders from supplying xi, yi that solve
equations in (A.27) is non-negative. In this case the debt holders will be paid in full and the equity holders695
will claim what remains and the firm will be solvent.
Proof of Proposition 4. Define ρ := ρEρD . First consider the case when ρ > 1. From (34), the equity holders’
problem is to
max
D
∫∞
θB(D)
(RE(xi) +RS(yi) + θ −D − φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)) g(θ)dθ
+ρ
∫ θB(D)
0
θg(θ)dθ + ρ(1−G(θB(D)))D − ρEK
⇔ max
D
(1−G(θB(D)))(RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)) +
∫∞
0
θg(θ)dθ
+(ρ− 1) ∫ θB(D)
0
θg(θ)dθ + (ρ− 1)(1−G(θB(D)))D − ρEK.
(A.29)
Since θB = D−RE(xi)−RS(yi) +φCE(xi) +φCS(yi) and ∂θB∂D = 1, the maximisation problem above yields
the following first-order condition when θB > 0
(ρ− 1)(1−G(θB(D∗i )))− ρ (RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)) g(θB(D∗i )) = 0, (A.30)
where D∗i is the optimal payment to the debt holders in case of solvency when in-house (i) production is
used. The second-order condition for the problem to be concave is
−(ρ− 1)g(θB(D∗i ))− ρg′(θB(D∗i ))(RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)) ≤ 0. (A.31)
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We only consider the case when the objective function is concave. The objective function is concave when
g′(θ) ≥ 0 or RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) ≤ − (ρ− 1)g(θ)
ρg′(θ)
. (A.32)
Recall that θB = max{0, D −RE(xi)−RS(yi) + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi)}. There are two cases to consider
1. ρDK − RE(xi) − RS(yi) + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi) ≤ 0. In this case the firm is always solvent since the
principal and the interest ρDK can be paid back even with θ = 0. Consequently, θB(D) = 0 and
capital requirement K is financed entirely through debt. Hence, k∗D = K and D
∗ = ρDK.700
2. ρDK − RE(xi) − RS(yi) + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi) > 0. An interior solution for k∗D is now possible. The
first-order condition in equation (A.30) can be rewritten as
(
1− 1
ρ
)
(1−G(θB(D∗i )))− (RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)) g(θB(D∗i )) = 0. (A.33)
There are 3 sub cases to consider:
(a) If there exists a D that (A.33) holds, then there is a unique interior solution to D (by concavity)
and k∗D ∈ (0,K).
(b) If the left hand side of (A.33) is greater than 0 for all D, then k∗D = K and the entire capital
requirement K is financed through debt.705
(c) If the left hand side of (A.33) is less than 0 for all D, then k∗D = 0 and the entire capital
requirement K is financed through equity.
Next, consider the case when ρE = ρD, that is ρ = 1. The equity holders’ maximisation problem simplifies
to choosing D to maximise
(1−G(θB(D))) (RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi))) +
∫∞
0
θg(θ)dθ − ρEK. (A.34)
Recall that θB(D) = max{0, D + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi)− RE(xi)− RS(yi)}. The maximum is attained when
θB(D) = 0. This is possible when k
∗
D = 0 by (33) and the entire capital requirement K is financed by equity.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that ρ := ρEρD . As shown in Propositions 2 and 4, when ρ ≤ 1 we have k∗D = 0
for both in-house production and outsourcing. As we increase ρ we need to assume that the inequalities in
(A.18) and (A.32) that ensure concavity continue to hold. In this case there is a threshold ρ below which
kD = 0 and above which there is an interior solution to kD defined by the first-order condition in (A.16) for
outsourcing and (A.30) for in-house production.715
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• First, consider outsourcing. In this case we derive the comparative statics of D∗ with respect to ρ
using (A.16) and find
∂D∗
∂ρ
=
1−G(D∗)
∆TSg′(θ) + (ρ− 1)g(D∗) > 0, (A.35)
where ∆TS = RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))−RS(y(1)) + CS(y(1)). This implies
that in this region
∂k∗D
∂ρ > 0.
• Next, consider in-house production. In this case, we derive the comparative statics of D∗i with respect
to ρ using (A.30) and find
∂D∗i
∂ρ
=
1−G(θB(D∗i ))− g(θB(D∗i ))(RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi))
(ρ− 1)g(θB(D∗i )) + ρ(RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi))g′(θB(D∗i ))
> 0. (A.36)
The numerator is positive due to equation (A.30) and the denominator is positive by the concavity
condition in inequality (A.32). Recall that
θB = max{0, D −RE(xi)−RS(yi) + φCE(xi) + φCS(yi)} (A.37)
and
ρDk
∗
D =
∫ θB
0
θg(θ)dθ + (1−G(θB))D (A.38)
Totally differentiating (A.38) with respect to ρ while implicitly defining ρD =
ρE
ρ we find
ρD
∂k∗D
∂ρ
= (1−G(θB)− g(θB)(RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)))∂D
∗
∂ρ
+ k∗D
ρE
ρ2
> 0. (A.39)
This is true since we have seen that ∂D
∗
∂ρ > 0 and 1−G(θB) > g(θB)(RE(xi) +RS(yi)−φCE(xi)−φCS(yi))
by (A.30).
Finally, as we increase ρ, there may be a threshold of ρ such that the respective first-order conditions720
hold for in-house production and outsourcing, such that k∗D = K. For ρ greater than this, k
∗
D is invariant to
increase in ρ. This implies that kD is weakly increasing in ρ when the objective function is concave.
Proof of Proposition 6. As discussed, the interesting parameter space is when
RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))
≥ RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi)
≥ RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)).
(A.40)
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Outside of this region, when RE(xi)+RS(yi)−φCE(xi)−φCS(yi) is larger than the first term (smaller than
the last term), the equity holders always prefer in-house production (outsourcing).725
When Assumption 2 is satisfied, there is no bankruptcy with in-house production. Capital requirement
K is financed entirely through debt since ρE ≥ ρD, and the payoff of the equity holders is
piiE = RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) + E(θ)− ρDK. (A.41)
On the other hand, with outsourcing, the payoff of the equity holders is
pioE = (1−G(D∗))(RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗)))
+G(D∗)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1))) + E(θ)−
∫D∗
0
θg(θ)dθ −D∗(1−G(D∗))
−ρE(K − k∗D)
= (1−G(D∗))(RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗)))
+G(D∗)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1))) + E(θ)− ρDk∗D − ρE(K − k∗D),
(A.42)
since ρDk
∗
D =
∫D∗
0
θg(θ)dθ +D∗(1−G(D∗)).
Appendix A.0.0.1. Consider case (a) where ρE = ρD.. In this case, K will be financed through equity and
outsourcing will be preferred since k∗D = D
∗ = 0 and pioE > pi
i
E simplifies to
RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗)) + E(θ)− ρEK
> RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) + E(θ)− ρDK,
(A.43)
which is true because of the inequalities in (A.40).
Appendix A.0.0.2. Consider case (b) where ρE > ρD.. Capital continues to be financed entirely through
debt for the case of in-house production. There are three possibilities for capital financing with outsourcing.
1. First, consider the case when capital is financed entirely through equity with outsourcing and k∗D = 0.
In this case D∗ = 0 and pioE > pi
i
E simplifies to
RS(y(γ
∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗))
> RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) + (ρE − ρD)K.
(A.44)
Since the last term is increasing in K, there exists a threshold K1 such that in-house production with730
debt financing is preferred.
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2. Second, consider the case when capital is financed entirely through debt with outsourcing. In this case,
k∗D = K and pi
o
E > pi
i
E simplifies to
(1−G(D∗))(RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗)))
+G(D∗)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)))
> RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi).
(A.45)
Since ρDK =
∫D∗
0
θg(θ)dθ+D∗(1−G(D∗)), we see that D∗ is increasing in K. Due to the inequalities
in (A.40), there must exist a threshold for K2 such that (A.45) cannot hold.
3. Finally, consider the case when there is an interior solution to k∗D and capital is financed through a mix
of debt and equity with outsourcing. Note that when k∗D is interior, there is no dependence of k
∗
D on
K. To see this, note that K only appears as a constant in the maximisation problem when the equity
holders choose D∗, and that k∗D is fully determined once the equity holders pick D
∗ as the optimal γ,
x and y are fully anticipated. Consequently, pioE > pi
i
E simplifies to
(1−G(D∗))(RS(y(γ∗)) +RE(x(γ∗))− CE(x(γ∗))− CS(y(γ∗)))
+G(D∗)(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1)))
> RE(xi) +RS(yi)− φCE(xi)− φCS(yi) + (ρE − ρD)(K − k∗D).
(A.46)
Since k∗D and D
∗ remain constant, an increase in K leads to in-house production with only debt
financing being preferred over outsourcing beyond some threshold level of K3.735
Since the condition under which pioE > pi
i
E differs across the three cases, the thresholds of K in the three
cases will be different.
Appendix B. Extension: Nash bargaining between the supplier and debt holders
In our model, with outsourcing in Stage 4, the supplier bargains with the debt holders. In this case we740
have assumed that the bargaining power is entirely with the supplier who consequently makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the debt holders. In this extension, we present a sketch of what would happen instead if we
allowed the debt holders some bargaining power.
To begin with, note that the outside option of the debt holders, when the supplier withholds y, is θ and the
additional surplus generated when y is supplied is RS(y)−CS(y). Allowing for both to have some bargaining745
power, the payoffs of the supplier and the debt holders are β(RS(y)−CS(y)) and θ+(1−β)(RS(y)−CS(y)),
respectively.
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Maximising his payoff, the supplier will choose y(1) and the equilibrium payoffs of the supplier and the
debt holders are β(RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1))) and θ + (1 − β)(RS(y(1)) − CS(y(1))). We now show that the
existence of an interval in θ with strategic bankruptcy survives this modification. To see this, note that the
supplier now triggers bankruptcy when
γ(RE(x(γ)) +RS(y(γ)) + θ −D)− CS(y(γ)) ≤ β(RS(y(1))− CS(y(1))). (B.1)
This is because the left hand side is the supplier’s payoff when he complies with the contract, whereas the
right hand side is his payoff when he triggers bankruptcy and works with the debt holders. Given Assumption
1, this condition holds when β = 1 at θ = θH = D. Note that the left hand of (B.1) is continuous and750
increasing in θ. The payoff for the supplier from complying with his contract with the equity holders and
exerting y(γ) is non positive at θ ≤ θL. On the other hand, the payoff from triggering strategic bankruptcy
is strictly positive at β(RS(y) − CS(y)). Consequently, there must exist a threshold θH(β) ∈ (θL, D), such
that the supplier strictly prefers to trigger strategic bankruptcy when θ ∈ (θL, θH(β)) to supplying y(γ). In
particular, θH(β) is simply the value of θ, such that condition (B.1) holds with equality.755
By inspecting (B.1), we observe that the value of θH(β) increases in β. Hence, the strategic bankruptcy
interval (θL, θH(β)) is increasing in β. Moreover, at β = 0 we will have θH(0) = θL and the region with
strategic bankruptcy will disappear entirely.
With this modification, we observe that the debt holders may be better off with strategic bankruptcy
when β ∈ (0, 1) and θ ∈ (θL, θH). It is clear that the supplier prefers strategic bankruptcy to complying with760
his contract with the equity holders and supplying y(γ). To see that the debt holders may be better off, note
that in this region the payoff of the debt holders with strategic bankruptcy is θ+(1−β)(RS(y(1))−CS(y(1)))
whereas their payoff in the case of solvency is D. Since θ+ (1− β)(RS(y(1))−CS(y(1))) > D is not feasible
even with θ < D, it is possible that the debt holders profit from strategic bankruptcy. organisational As
shown above, the region with strategic bankruptcy survives even when we allow the debt holders to have765
bargaining power at the post-bankruptcy stage when they negotiate with the supplier. This modification
however makes the rest of the model less tractable since θH(β) now also depends on γ through its dependence
on x(γ) and y(γ) as seen in condition (B.1). This complicates the equity holders’ problem in Stage 2 when
they choose the function γ(θ). This is because the second order condition in the optimisation problem is
no longer straightforward. To avoid this complication, we continue to use the special case of β = 1 in our770
model.
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